蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Bargaining and Information Acquisition
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 17,
no. 3, August 2025
(pp. 75–102)
Abstract
We consider an ultimatum game where the value of the object being sold to the buyer is high or low. The seller knows the value, but the buyer does not. The value to the seller is zero. We introduce the option for the buyer to acquire costly information after an offer is made. This information either confirms the high value or provides no information. As the cost of information vanishes, the buyer gets all the surplus in a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, although the option to acquire information is never used. Moreover, this signal structure is optimal for the buyer.Citation
Chatterjee, Kalyan, Miaomiao Dong, and Tetsuya Hoshino. 2025. "Bargaining and Information Acquisition." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 17 (3): 75–102. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240034Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness