蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Optimal Design of Market Access
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 1–38)
Abstract
We study a data provider's problem of optimally designing and selling marketing lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer's types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple "fixed-price" implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing.Citation
Yamashita, Takuro, and Shuguang Zhu. 2026. "Optimal Design of Market Access." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 18 (3): 1–38. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240324Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
- M31 Marketing