蝌蚪网 Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role of Selection
蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 11,
no. 4, November 2019
(pp. 96–123)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the public sector. Focusing on the world's least corrupt country, Denmark, we use a survey experiment to document strong self-selection of more honest individuals into public service. This result differs sharply from existing findings from more corrupt settings. Differences in pro-social versus pecuniary motivation appear central to the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more pecuniarily motivated and self-select out of public service into higher-paying private sector jobs. Accordingly, we find that increasing public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark.Citation
Barfort, Sebastian, Nikolaj A. Harmon, Frederik Hjorth, and Asmus Leth Olsen. 2019. "Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role of Selection." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy 11 (4): 96–123. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170688Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets