蝌蚪网 Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy
蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 17,
no. 3, August 2025
(pp. 131–64)
Abstract
Fiscal rules, or constraints on the policymaking discretion of elected officials, are widely used to regulate fiscal policies. Using data on Italian municipalities, we employ a difference-in-discontinuity design to provide evidence of the negative effect of fiscal rules on mayoral candidates' education. Municipalities in which fiscal rules meaningfully restrict the action space of politicians drive the effect. These results are consistent with a formal model of fiscal rules and political selection. We highlight that reducing discretion may affect the composition of the pool of players: It may alleviate pork barrel spending but also negatively affect the education of politicians.Citation
Gamalerio, Matteo, and Federico Trombetta. 2025. "Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy 17 (3): 131–64. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220325Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E62 Fiscal Policy
- H62 National Deficit; Surplus
- H72 State and Local Budget and Expenditures