蝌蚪网 Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Information Frictions and Skill Signaling in the Youth Labor Market
蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy
(pp. 1–33)
Abstract
This paper provides evidence that information frictions limit the labor market trajectories of US youth. We provide credible skill signals鈥攔ecommendation letters based on supervisor feedback鈥攖o a random subset of 43,409 participants in New York's summer jobs program. Letters increase employment the following year by 3 percentage points (4.5 percent). Earnings effects grow over four years to a cumulative $1,349 (4.9 percent). We find little evidence of increased job search or confidence; instead, signals may help employers better identify successful matches with high-productivity workers. Pulling youth into the labor market can, however, hamper on-time graduation, especially among low-achieving students.Citation
Heller, Sara B., and Judd B. Kessler. 2024. "Information Frictions and Skill Signaling in the Youth Labor Market." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy 16 (4): 1–33. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220544Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J64 Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search