蝌蚪网 Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence
蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy
(pp. 190–218)
Abstract
What is the effect of politicians' wages on corruption in the presence of criminal groups that use both bribes and violence? With a regression discontinuity design and three distinct proxies for corruption, we show that better-paid Italian politicians are more likely to promote transparency and competition in procurement but also more likely to incur criminal attacks. The effects of wages, which subside after three years, are driven by changes in incumbents' behavior rather than improved selection. These findings show how higher wages may curb corruption, but also foster the use of violence as an alternative tool to influence policymaking.Citation
Pulejo, Massimo, and Pablo Querub铆n. 2026. "Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Economic Policy 18 (1): 190–218. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240383Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law