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Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

By Abhijit Banerjee, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, and Michael Walton

òòò½Íø Journal: Applied Economics, July 2024

Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterpart...

Persecution and Escape: Professional Networks and High-Skilled Emigration from Nazi Germany

By Sascha O. Becker, Volker Lindenthal, Sharun W. Mukand, and Fabian Waldinger

òòò½Íø Journal: Applied Economics, July 2024

We study the role of professional networks in facilitating emigration of Jewish academics dismissed from their positions by the Nazi government. We use individual-level exogenous variation in the timing of dismissals to estimate causal effects. Academics ...

Health Care Centralization: The Health Impacts of Obstetric Unit Closures in the United States

By Stefanie Fischer, Heather Royer, and Corey White

òòò½Íø Journal: Applied Economics, July 2024

Over the last few decades, health care services in the United States have become more geographically centralized. We study how the loss of hospital-based obstetric units in over 400 counties affects maternal and infant health via a difference-in-differenc...

Demographic Origins of the Start-up Deficit

By Fatih Karahan, Benjamin Pugsley, and ´¡²âÅŸ±ð²µÃ¼±ô ½¢²¹³ó¾±²Ô

òòò½Íø Review, July 2024

We propose a simple explanation for the long-run decline in the US start-up rate. It originates from a slowdown in labor supply growth since the late 1970s, largely predetermined by demographics. This channel can explain roughly half of the decline and wh...

Information Choice in Auctions

By Nina Bobkova

òòò½Íø Review, July 2024

The choice of an auction mechanism influences which object characteristics bidders learn about and whether the object is allocated efficiently. Some object characteristics are valued equally by all bidders and thus are inconsequential for the efficient al...